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Abstract
The idea of a multiverse – an ensemble of universes or universe do-
mains – has received increasing attention in cosmology, both as the out-
come of the originating process that generated our own universe, and as
an explanation for why our universe appears to be fine-tuned for life and
consciousness. Here we review how multiverses should be defined, stress-
ing the distinction between the collection of all possible universes and
ensembles of really existing universes, which distinction is essential for
anthropic arguments. We show that such realised multiverses are by no
means unique, and in general require the existence of a well-defined and
physically motivated distribution function on the space of all possible uni-
verses. Furthermore, a proper measure on these spaces is also needed, so
that probabilities can be calculated. We then discuss several other physi-
cal and philosophical problems arising in the context of ensembles of uni-
verses, including realized infinities and the issue of fine-tuning – whether
very special or generic primordial conditions are more fundamental in cos-
mology. Then we briefly summarise scenarios like chaotic inflation, which
suggest how ensembles of universe domains may be generated, and point
out that the regularities underlying any systematic description of truly
disjoint multiverses must imply some kind of common generating mech-
anism, whose testability is problematic. Finally, we discuss the issue of
testability, which underlies the question of whether multiverse proposals
are really scientific propositions rather than metaphysical proposals.
Key Words: Cosmology; inflation; multiverses; anthropic principle
1 Introduction
Over the past twenty years the proposal of a really existing ensemble of universes
– a ‘multiverse’ – has gained prominence in cosmology, even though there is
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so far only inadequate theoretical and observational support for its existence.
The popularity of this proposal can be traced to two factors. The first is that
quite a few promising programs of research in quantum and very early universe
cosmology suggest that the very processes which could have brought our universe
or region of the universe into existence from a primordial quantum configuration,
would have generated many other universes or universe regions as well. This was
first modelled in a specific way by Vilenkin (1983) and was developed by Linde
(Linde 1983, 1990) in his chaotic cosmology scenario. Since then many others,
e. g. Leslie (1996), Weinberg (2000), Sciama (1993), Deutsch (1998), Tegmark
(1998, 2003), Smolin (1999), Lewis (2000), Weinberg (2000), and Rees (2001)
have discussed ways in which an ensemble of universes or universe domains
might originate physically. More recently specific impetus has been given to
this possibility by superstring theory. It is now claimed by some that versions
of these theories provide “landscapes” populated by a large number of vacua,
* each of which could occur in or initiate a separate universe domain,* with
different values of the physical parameters, such as the cosmological constant,
the masses of the elementary particles and the strengths of their interactions
(Kachru, et al. 2003; Susskind 2003, 2005, and references therein).
So far, none of these proposals has been developed to the point of actually
describing such ensembles of universes in detail, nor has it been demonstrated
that a generic well-defined ensemble will admit life. Some writers tend to im-
ply that there is only one possible multiverse, characterised by “all that can
exist does exist” (Lewis 2000, see also Gardner 2003). This vague prescription
actually allows a vast variety of different realisations with differing properties,
leading to major problems in the definition of the ensembles and in averaging,
due to the lack of a well-defined measure and the infinite character of the en-
semble itself. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that we shall ever be able to
accurately delineate the class of all possible universes.
The second factor stimulating the popularity of multiverses is that it is
the only scientific way of avoiding the fine-tuning seemingly required for our
universe. This applies firstly to the cosmological constant, which seems to be
fine-tuned by 120 orders of magnitude relative to what is expected on the basis
of quantum field theory (Weinberg 2000, Susskind 2005). If (almost) all values
of the cosmological constant occur in a multiverse, then we can plausibly live
in one with the very low observed non-zero value; indeed such a low value is
required in order that galaxies, stars, and planets exist and provide us with a
suitable habitat for life.
This is an example of the second motivation, namely the ‘anthropic principle’
connection: If any of a large number of parameters which characterize our
universe – including fundamental constants, the cosmological constant, and and
initial conditions – were slightly different, our universe would not be suitable for
complexity or life. What explains the precise adjustment of these parameters
so that microscopic and macroscopic complexity and life eventually emerged?
One can introduce a “Creator” who intentionally sets their values to assure the
eventual development of complexity. But this move takes us beyond science.
The existence of a large collection of universes, which represents the full range
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of possible parameter values, though not providing an ultimate explanation,
would provide a scientifically accessible way of avoiding the need for such fine-
tuning. If physical cosmogonic processes naturally produced such a variety of
universes, one of which was ours, then the puzzle of fine- tuning is solved. We
simply find ourselves in one in which all the many conditions for life have been
fulfilled.
Of course, through cosmology we must then discover and describe the process
by which that collection of diverse universes, or universe domains, was gener-
ated, or at least could have been generated, with the full range of characteristics
they possess. This may be possible. It is analogous to the way in which we look
upon the special character of our Solar System. We do not agonize how initial
conditions for the Earth and Sun were specially set so that life would eventually
emerge – though at some level that is still a mystery. We simply realize that
our Solar System in one of hundreds of billions of others in the Milky Way, and
accept that, though the probability that any one of them is bio-friendly is very
low, at least a few of them will naturally be so. We have emerged as observers
in one of those. No direct fine-tuning is required, provided we take for granted
both the nature of the laws of physics and the specific initial conditions in the
universe. The physical processes of stellar formation throughout our galaxy
naturally leads to the generation of the full range of possible stellar systems and
planets.
Before going on, it is necessary to clarify our terminology. Some refer to
the separate expanding universe regions in chaotic inflation as ‘universes’, even
though they have a common causal origin and are all part of the same sin-
gle spacetime. In our view (as ‘uni’ means ‘one’) the Universe is by definition
the one unique connected1 existing spacetime of which our observed expanding
cosmological domain is a part. We will refer to situations such as in chaotic
inflation as a Multi-Domain Universe, as opposed to a completely causally dis-
connected Multiverse. Throughout this paper, when our discussion pertains
equally well to disjoint collections of universes (multiverses in the strict sense)
and to the different domains of a Multi-Domain Universe, we shall for simplic-
ity simply use the word “ensemble”. When the universes of an ensemble are
all sub-regions of a larger connected spacetime - the “Universe as a whole”- we
have the multi-domain situation, which should be described as such. Then we
can reserve “multiverse” for the collection of genuinely disconnected “universes”
– those which are not locally causally related.
In this article, we shall critically examine the concept of an ensemble of
universes or universe domains, from both physical and philosophical points of
view, reviewing how they are to be defined physically and mathematically in
cosmology (Ellis, Kirchner and Stoeger 2003, hereafter referred to as EKS),
how their existence could conceivably be validated scientifically, and focusing
1“Connected” implies “Locally causally connected”, that is all universe domains are con-
nected by C0 timelike lines which allow any number of reversals in their direction of time, as
in Feynman’s approach to electrodynamics. Thus, it is a union of regions that are causally
connected to each other, and transcends particle and event horizons; for example all points in
de Sitter space time are connected to each other by such lines.
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upon some of the key philosophical problems associated with them. We have
already addressed the physics and cosmology of such ensembles in a previous
paper (EKS), along with some limited discussion of philosophical issues. Here
we shall summarize the principal conclusions of that paper and then discuss in
detail the more philosophical issues.
First of all, we review the description of the the set of possible universes and
sets of realised (i. e., really existing) universes and the relationship between
these two kinds of sets. It is fundamental to have a general provisionally ade-
quate scheme to describe the set of all possible universes. Using this we can then
move forward to describe potential sets of actually existing universes by defining
distribution functions (discrete or continuous) on the space of possible universes.
A given distribution function indicates which of the theoretically possible uni-
verses have been actualized to give us a really existing ensemble of universes or
universe domains. It is obviously crucial to maintain the distinction between the
set of all possible universes, and the set of all existing universes. For it is the set
of all existing universes which needs to be explained by cosmology and physics –
that is, by a primordial originating process or processes. Furthermore, it is only
an actually existing ensemble of universes with the required range of properties
which can provide an explanation for the existence of our bio-friendly universe
without fine-tuning (see also McMullin 1993, p. 371). A conceptually possible
ensemble is not sufficient for this purpose – one needs universes which actually
exist, along with mechanisms which generate their existence. We consider in
some depth how the existence of such an actually existing ensemble might be
probed experimentally and observationally - this is the key issue determining
whether the proposal is truly a scientific one or not.
Though the ensemble of all possible universes is undoubtedly infinite, having
an infinite ensemble of actually existing universes is problematic – and further-
more blocks our ability to assign statistical measures to it, as we shall discuss in
some detail later. For all these reasons, any adequate cosmological account of
the origin of our universe as one of a collection of many universes – or even as a
single realised universe – must include a process whereby the realised ensemble
is selected from the space of all possible universes and physically generated. But
it must also provide some metaphysical view on the origin of the set of possible
universes as a subset of the set of conceivable universes - which is itself a very
difficult set to define2.
2 Describing Ensembles: Possibility
To characterize an ensemble of existing universes, we first need to develop ad-
equate methods for describing the class of all possible universes. This itself is
philosophically controversial, as it depends very much on what we regard as
”possible.” At the very least, describing the class of all possible universes re-
quires us to specify, at least in principle, all the ways in which universes can
2Science fiction and fantasy provide a rich treasury of conceivable universes, many of which
will not be ”possible universes” as outlined above.
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be different from one another, in terms of their physics, chemistry, biology, etc.
We have done this in EKS, which we shall review here.
2.1 The Set of Possible Universes
Ensembles of universes, or multiverses, are most easily represented classically
by the structure and the dynamics of a space M of all possible universes, each
of which can be described in terms of a set of states s in a state space S
(EKS). Each universe m inM will be characterised by a set P of distinguishing
parameters p, which are coordinates on S (EKS). Each m will evolve from its
initial state to some final state according to the operative dynamics, with some
or all of its parameters varying as it does so. The course of this evolution of
states will be represented by a path in the state space S. Thus, each such path
(in degenerate cases, a point) is a representation of one of the universesm inM.
The parameter space P has dimension N which is the dimension of the space
of models M; the space of states S has N + 1 dimensions, the extra dimension
indicating the change of each model’s states with time, characterised by an extra
parameter, e.g., the Hubble parameter H which does not distinguish between
models but rather determines what is the state of dynamical evolution of each
model. Note that N may be infinite, and indeed will be so unless we consider
only geometrically highly restricted sets of universes.
This classical, non-quantum-cosmological formulation of the set of all pos-
sible universes is obviously provisional and not fundamental. Much less should
it provide the basis for adjudicating the ontology of these ensembles and their
components.3 It provides us with a preliminary systematic framework, con-
sistent with our present limited understanding of cosmology, within which to
begin studying ensembles of universes and universe domains. It is becoming
very clear that, from what we are beginning to learn from quantum cosmology,
a more fundamental framework will have to be developed that takes seriously
quantum issues such as entanglement. Additionally, there are serious unresolved
problems concerning time in quantum cosmology. Already at the level of gen-
eral relativity itself, as everyone recognizes, time loses its fundamental, distinct
character. What is given is space-time, not space and time. Time is now in-
trinsic to a given universe domain and its dynamics and there is no preferred or
unique way of defining it (Isham 1988, 1993; Smolin 1991; Barbour 1994; Rovelli
2004; and references therein). When we go to quantum gravity and quantum
cosmology, time, while remaining intrinsic, recedes further in prominence and
even seems to disappear. The Wheeler-de Witt equation for “wave function
of the universe,” for example, does not explicitly involve time – it is a time-
independent equation. However, our provisional classical formulation receives
support from the fact that dynamics and an intrinsic time appear to emerge
from it as the universe expands out of the Planck era (see, for instance, Isham
1988 and Rovelli 2004, especially pp. 296-301). Furthermore, as yet there is
3We thank and acknowledge the contribution of an anonymous referee who has pointed this
out to us, and has stimulated this brief discussion of the important role of quantum cosmology
in defining multiverses.
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no adequate quantum gravity theory nor quantum cosmological resolution to
this issue of the origin and the fundamental character of time – just tantaliz-
ing pieces of a much larger picture. The only viable approach at present is to
proceed on the basis of the emergent classical description.
And then there are related issues connected with decoherence – how is the
transition from “the wave function of the universe” to the classical universe, or
an ensemble of universe domains, effected, and what emerges in this transition?
What is crucial here is that as the wave function decoheres an entire ensemble of
universes or universe domains may emerge. These would all be entangled with
one another. This would provide the fundamental basis for the quantum ontol-
ogy of the ensemble.4 Furthermore, it would provide a fundamental connection
among a large number of the members of our classically defined M above. We
have already stressed the difference between a multi-domain universe and a true
multiverse. An entangled ensemble of universe domains decohering from a cos-
mological wave function would be an important example of that case. This
process of cosmological decoherence, which we as yet do not understand and
have not adequately modelled , may turn out to be a key generating mecha-
nism for a really existing multiverse. In that case we would want to define a
much more fundamental space of all possible cosmological wave functions. Each
of these would generate an ensemble of classical universes or universe domains
which we have represented individually in M. We could then map the wave-
functions in that more fundamental space into the m of M. As yet, however,
we do not have even a minimally reliable quantum cosmology that would enable
us to implement that.
Despite our lack of understanding at the quantum cosmological level, and the
less than fundamental character of our spaceM, it enables us proceed with our
discussion of cosmological ensembles at the non-quantum level - which is what
cosmological observations relate to. While doing so, we must keep the quantum
cosmological perspective in mind. Though we are without the resources to
elaborate it more fully, it provides a valuable context within which to interpret,
evaluate and critique our more modest classical discussion here.
Returning to our description of the space M of possible universes m, we
must recognize that it is based on an assumed set of laws of behaviour, either
laws of physics or meta-laws that determine the laws of physics, which all m
have in common. Without this, we have no basis for defining it. Its overall
characterisation must therefore incorporate a description both of the geometry
of the allowed universes and of the physics of matter. Thus the set of parameters
P will include both geometric and physical parameters.
Among the important subsets of the spaceM are (EKS):MFLRW, the subset
of all possible Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre-Robertson-Walker (FLRW) universes, which
are exactly isotropic and spatially homogeneous; Malmost−FLRW, the subset of
all universes which deviate from exact FLRW models by only small, linearly
growing anisotropies and inhomogeneities;Manthropic, the subset of all possible
universes in which life emerges at some stage in their evolution. This subset
4Again, we thank the same referee for emphasizing the importance of the possibility.
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intersectsMalmost−FLRW, and may even be a subset ofMalmost−FLRW, but does
not intersect MFLRW, since realistic models of a life-bearing universe like ours
cannot be exactly FLRW, for then there is no structure.
If M truly represents all possibilities, as we have already emphasized, one
must have a description that is wide enough to encompass all possibilities. It
is here that major issues arise: how do we decide what all the possibilities are?
What are the limits of possibility? What classifications of possibility are to be
included? From these considerations we have the first key issue (EKS):
Issue 1: What determinesM? Where does this structure come from? What is
the meta-cause, or ground, that delimits this set of possibilities? Why is there
a uniform structure across all universes m in M?
It should be obvious that these same questions would also have to be ad-
dressed with regard to the more fundamental space of all cosmological wave
functions we briefly described earlier, which would probably underlie any en-
sembles of universes or universe domains drawn from M. It is clear, as we
have discussed in EKS, that these questions cannot be answered scientifically,
though scientific input is necessary for doing so. How can we answer them
philosophically?
2.2 Adequately Specifying Possible Anthropic Universes
When defining any ensemble of universes, possible or realised, we must specify all
the parameters which differentiate members of the ensemble from one another
at any time in their evolution. The values of these parameters may not be
known or determinable initially in many cases – some of them may only be
set by transitions that occur via processes like symmetry breaking within given
members of the ensemble. In particular, some of the parameters whose values
are important for the origination and support of life may only be fixed later in
the evolution of universes in the ensemble.
We can separate our set of parametersP for the space of all possible universes
M into different categories, beginning with the most basic or fundamental, and
progressing to more contingent and more complex categories (see EKS). Ideally
they should all be independent of one another, but we will not be able to es-
tablish that independence for each parameter, except for the most fundamental
cosmological ones. In order to categorise our parameters, we can doubly index
each parameter p in P as pj(i) such that those for j = 1 − 2 describe basic
physics, for j = 3 − 5 describe the cosmology (given that basic physics), and
j = 6 − 7 pertain specifically to emergence of complexity and of life (see EKS
for further details).
Though we did not do so in our first paper EKS, it may be helpful to add
a separate category of parameters p8(i), which would relate directly to the
emergence of consciousness and self-conscious life, as well as to the causal effec-
tiveness of self-conscious (human) life – of ideas, intentions and goals. It may
turn out that all such parameters may be able to be reduced to those of p7(i),
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just as those of p6(i) and p7(i) may be reducible to those of physics. But we
also may discover, instead, that such reducibility is not possible.
All these parameters will describe the set of possibilities we are able to char-
acterise on the basis of our accumulated scientific experience. This is by no
means a statement that “all that can occur” is arbitrary. On the contrary, spec-
ifying the set of possible parameters determines a uniform high-level structure
that is obeyed by all universes in M.
In the companion cosmology/physics paper to this one (EKS), we develop
in detail the geometry, parameters p5(i), and the physics, parameters p1(i) to
p4(i), of possible universes. There we also examine in detail the FLRW sector
MFLRW of the ensemble of all possible universes M to illustrate the relevant
mathematical and physical issues. We shall not repeat those discussions here, as
they do not directly impact our treatment of the philosophical issues upon which
we are focusing. However, since one of the primary motivations for developing
the multiverse scenario is to provide a scientific solution to the anthropic fine-
tuning problem, we need to discuss briefly the set of ”anthropic” universes.
2.3 The Anthropic subset
The subset of universes that allow intelligent life to emerge is of particular
interest. That means we need a function on the set of possible universes that
describes the probability that life may evolve. An adaptation of the Drake
equation (Drake and Shostak 1998) gives for the expected number of planets
with intelligent life in any particular universe m in an ensemble (EKS),
Nlife(m) = Ng ∗NS ∗Π ∗ F, (1)
where Ng is the number of galaxies in the model and NS the average number
of stars per galaxy. The probability that a star provides a habitat for life is
expressed by the product
Π = fS ∗ fp ∗ ne (2)
and the probability of the emergence of intelligent life, given such a habitat, is
expressed by the product
F = fl ∗ fi. (3)
Here fS is the fraction of stars that can provide a suitable environment for life
(they are ‘Sun-like’), fp is the fraction of such stars that are surrounded by
planetary systems, ne is the mean number of planets in each such system that
are suitable habitats for life (they are ‘Earth-like’), fl is the fraction of such
planets on which life actually originates, and fi represents the fraction of those
planets on which there is life where intelligent beings develop. The anthropic
subset of a possibility space is that set of universes for which Nlife(m) > 0.
The quantities {Ng, NS , fS, fp, ne, fl, fi} are functions of the physical and
cosmological parameters characterised above. So there will be many different
representations of this parameter set depending on the degree to which we try
to represent such interrelations.
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In EKS, following upon our detailed treatment ofMFLRW we identify those
FLRW universes in which the emergence and sustenance of life is possible on a
broad level5 – the necessary cosmological conditions have been fulfilled allowing
existence of galaxies, stars, and planets if the universe is perturbed, so allowing
a non-zero factor Ng ∗ NS ∗ Π as discussed above. The fraction of these that
will actually be life-bearing depends on the fulfilment of a large number of other
conditions represented by the factor F = fl ∗ fi, which will also vary across a
generic ensemble, and the above assumes this factor is non-zero.
3 The Set of Realised Universes
We have now characterised the set of possible universes. But in any given ex-
isting ensemble, many will not be realised, and some may be realised many
times. The purpose of this section is to review our formalism (EKS) for speci-
fying which of the possible universes (characterised above) occur in a particular
realised ensemble.
3.1 A distribution function for realised universes
In order to select from M a set of realised universes we need to define on M
a distribution function f(m) specifying how many times each type of possible
universe m in M is realised6. The function f(m) expresses the contingency in
any actualisation – the fact that not every possible universe has to be realised.
Things could have been different! Thus, f(m) describes the ensemble of uni-
verses or multiverse envisaged as being realised out of the set of possibilities.
In general, these realisations include only a subset of possible universes, and
multiple realisation of some of them. Even at this early stage of our discussion
we can see that the really existing ensemble of universes is by no means unique.
From a quantum cosmology perspective we can consider f(m) as given by
an underlying solution of the Wheeler-de Witt equation, by a given superstring
model, or by some other generating mechanism, giving an entangled ensemble
of universes or universe domains.
The class of models considered is determined by all the parameters which
are held constant (‘class parameters’). Considering the varying parameters for
a given class (‘member parameters’), some will take only discrete values, but
for each one allowed to take continuous values we need a volume element of the
possibility space M characterised by parameter increments dpj(i) in all such
5More accurately, perturbations of these models can allow life – the exact FLRW models
themselves cannot do so.
6It has been suggested to us that in mathematical terms it does not make sense to distin-
guish identical copies of the same object: they should be identified with each other because
they are essentially the same. But we are here dealing with physics rather than mathemat-
ics, and with real existence rather than possible existence, and then multiple copies must be
allowed (for example all electrons are identical to each other; physics would be very different
if there were only one electron in existence).
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varying parameters pj(i). The volume element will be given by a product
pi = Πi,j mij(m) dpj(i) (4)
where the product Πi,j runs over all continuously varying member parameters
i, j in the possibility space, and the mij weight the contributions of the dif-
ferent parameter increments relative to each other. These weights depend on
the parameters pj(i) characterising the universe m. The number of universes
corresponding to the set of parameter increments dpj(i) will be dN given by
dN = f(m)pi (5)
for continuous parameters; for discrete parameters, we add in the contribution
from all allowed parameter values. The total number of universes in the ensem-
ble will be given by
N =
∫
f(m)pi (6)
(which will often diverge), where the integral ranges over all allowed values of the
member parameters and we take it to include all relevant discrete summations.
The probable value of any specific quantity p(m) defined on the set of universes
will be given by
P =
∫
p(m)f(m)pi∫
f(m)pi
(7)
Such integrals over the space of possibilities give numbers, averages, and prob-
abilities.
Now it is conceivable that all possibilities are realised – that all universes in
M exist at least once. This would mean that the distribution function
f(m) 6= 0 for all m ∈M.
But there are an infinite number of distribution functions which would fulfil this
condition. So not even a really existing ‘ensemble of all possible universes’ is
unique. In such ensembles, all possible values of each distinguishing parame-
ter would be represented by its members in all possible combinations with all
other parameters at least once. One of the problems is that this means that
the integrals associated with such distribution functions would often diverge,
preventing the calculation of probabilities.
From these considerations we have the second key issue:
Issue 2: What determines f(m)? What is the meta-cause that delimits the
set of realisations out of the set of possibilities?
The answer to this question has to be different from the answer to Issue 1,
precisely because here we are describing the contingency of selection of a subset
of possibilities for realisation from the set of all possibilities – determination of
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the latter being what is considered in Issue 1. As we saw in EKS, and as we
shall further discuss here (see Section 6), these questions can, in principle, be
partially answered scientifically. A really existing ensemble of universes or uni-
verse domains demands the operation of a generating process, which adequately
explains the origin of its members with their ranges of characteristics and their
distribution over the parameters describing them, from a more fundamental po-
tential, a specific primordial quantum configuration, or the decoherence of a
specific cosmological wave function. That is, there must be a specific generating
process, whatever it is, which determines f(m). When it comes to the further
question, what is responsible for the operation of this or that specific generating
process rather than some other one which would generate a different ensemble,
we see (EKS) that an adequate answer cannot be given scientifically. This is
the question why the primordial dynamics leading to the given really existing
ensemble of universes is of a certain type rather than of some other type. Even
if we could establish f(m) in detail, it is difficult to imagine how we would
scientifically explain why one generating process was instantiated rather than
some other one. The only possibility for an answer, if any, is via philosophical,
or possibly theological, considerations.
3.2 Measures and Probabilities
From what we have seen above, it is clear that f(m) will enable us to derive
numbers and probabilities relative to the realisation it defines only if we also
have determined a unique measure pi on the ensemble, characterised by a specific
choice of the weights mij(m) in (4), where these weights will depend on the
pj(i). There are a number of difficult challenges we face in doing this, including
the lack of a “natural measure” on M in all its coordinates, the determination
of f(m), or its equivalent, from compelling physical considerations, and the
possible divergence of the probability integrals (see Kirchner and Ellis, 2003).
These issues have been discussed in EKS.
3.3 The Anthropic subset
The expression (1) can be used in conjunction with the distribution function
f(m) of universes to determine the expected number of planets bearing intelli-
gent life arising in the whole ensemble:
Nlife(E) =
∫
f(m) ∗Ng ∗NS ∗ fS ∗ fp ∗ ne ∗ fl ∗ fi ∗ pi (8)
(which is a particular case of (7) based on (1)). An anthropic ensemble is one
for which Nlife(E) > 0. If the distribution function derives from a probability
function, we may combine the probability functions to get an overall anthropic
probability function - for an example see Weinberg (2000), where it is assumed
that the probability for galaxy formation is the only relevant parameter for the
existence of life. This is equivalent to assuming that NS ∗fS ∗fp ∗ne ∗fl ∗fi > 0.
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This assumption might be acceptable in our physically realised Universe,
but there is no reason to believe it would hold generally in an ensemble because
these parameters will depend on other ensemble parameters, which will vary.
4 Anthropic Parameters, Complexity and Life
The astrophysical issues expressed in the product Π (the lower-j parameters:
j ≤ 6) are the easier ones to investigate anthropically. We can in principle make
a cut between those consistent with the eventual emergence of life and those
incompatible with it by considering each of the factors in Ng, NS , and Π in
turn, taking into account their dependence on the parameters p1(i) to p5(i),
and only considering the next factor if all the previous ones are non-zero. In
this way we can assign “bio-friendly intervals” to the possibility space M. If
Ng ∗NS ∗ Π is non-zero we can move on to considering similarly whether F is
non-zero, based on the parameters p6(i) to p8(i), determining if true complexity
is possible, which in turn depends on the physics parameters p1(i) in a crucial
way that is not fully understood.
As we go to higher-level parameters we will narrow the number of the number
of universes consistent with self-conscious life even more. Essentially, we shall
have the sequence of inequalities:
N8 < N7 < N6 < N5 < N4 < N3 < N2 < N1,
where Nj is the total number of universes specified by parameters of level j
which are compatible with the eventual emergence of self-conscious life.
This clearly fits very nicely with the Bayesian Inference approach to probabil-
ity and provides the beginnings of an implementation of it for these multiverses.
This approach also clearly keeps the distinction between necessary and sufficient
conditions intact throughout. At each level we add to the necessary conditions
for complexity or life, weeding out those universes which fail to meet any sin-
gle necessary condition. Sufficiency is never really reached in our description –
we really do not know the full set of conditions which achieve sufficiency. Life
demands unique combinations of many different parameter values that must be
realised simultaneously. Higher-order (j ≥ 6) parameters pj(i) may not even
be relevant for many universes or universe domains in a given ensemble, since
the structures and processes to which they refer may only be able to emerge for
certain very narrow ranges of the lower-j parameters. It may also turn out, as
we have already mentioned, that higher-level parameters may be reducible to
the lower-level parameters.
It will be impossible at any stage to characterise that set of M in which all
the conditions necessary for the emergence of self-conscious life and its main-
tenance have been met, for we do not know what those conditions are (for
example, we do not know if there are forms of life possible that are not based on
carbon and organic chemistry). Nevertheless it is clear that life demands unique
combinations of many different parameter values that must be realised simulta-
neously, but do not necessarily involve all parameters (for example Hogan [22]
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suggests that only 8 of the parameters of the standard particle physics model are
involved in the emergence of complexity). When we look at these combinations,
they will span a very small subset of the whole parameter space (Davies 2003,
Tegmark 2003).
5 Problems With Infinity
When speaking of multiverses or ensembles of universes – possible or realised –
the issue of infinity inevitably crops up. Researchers often envision an infinite
set of universes, in which all possibilities are realised. Can there be an infinite
set of really existing universes? We suggest that the answer may very well be
“No”. The common perception that this is possible arises from not appreciating
the precisions in meaning and the restrictions in application associated with this
profoundly difficult concept. Because we can assign a symbol to represent ‘in-
finity’ and can manipulate that symbol according to specified rules, we assume
corresponding “infinite” entities can exist in practice. This is questionable7.
Furthermore, as we have already indicated, such infinities lead to severe calcu-
lational problems in the mathematical modelling of ensembles of universes or
universe domains, blocking any meaningful application of probability calculus.
It is very helpful to recognize at the outset that there are two different
concepts of “the infinite” which are often used: The metaphysical infinite,
which designates wholeness, perfection, self-sufficiency; and the mathematical
infinite, which represents that which is without limit (Moore 1990, pp.1-2, 34-
44; Bracken 1995, p.142, n.12). Here we are concerned with the mathematical
infinite8. But, now there are really two basic categories of the mathematical
infinite: The potential or conceptual infinite and the actual, or realised, infi-
nite. This distinction goes back to rather diffuse but very relevant discussions
by Aristotle in his Physics and his Metaphysics. Basically, the potential or con-
ceptual infinite refers to a process or set conceptually defined so that it has no
limit to it – it goes on and on, e.g. the integers. The concept defining the set or
process is without a bound or limit, and open, i. e. it does not repeat or retrace
what is already produced or counted. The actual, or realized, infinite would be
a concrete real object or entity, or set of objects, which is open and has no limit
to its specifications (in space, time, number of components, etc.), no definite
upper bound. Aristotle and many others since have argued that, though there
are many examples of potential or conceptual infinities, actual realised infinities
are not possible as applied to entities or groups of entities.9
There is no conceptual problem with an infinite set – countable or uncount-
able – of possible or conceivable universes. However, as David Hilbert (1964)
7Our discussion here follows EKS, with the addition of supporting philosophical material
and references.
8For a fascinating and very readable, but somewhat eccentric, recent history of mathe-
matical infinity and its connections with key mathematical developments, see David Foster
Wallace (2003)
9Bracken (1995, pp.11-24) gives a recent critical summary of Aristotle’s treatment of these
issues, and their later use by Thomas Aquinas, Schelling and Heidegger (Bracken, pp.25-51).
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points out, the presumed existence of the actually infinite directly or indirectly
leads to well-recognised unresolvable contradictions in set theory (e. g., the Rus-
sell paradox, involving the set of all sets which do not contain themselves, which
by definition must both be a member of itself and not a member of itself!), and
thus in the definitions and deductive foundations of mathematics itself (Hilbert,
pp.141-142).
Hilbert’s basic position is that “Just as operations with the infinitely small
were replaced by operations with the finite which yielded exactly the same
results . . ., so in general must deductive methods based on the infinite be
replaced by finite procedures which yield exactly the same results.” (p.135) He
strongly maintains that “the infinite is nowhere to be found in reality, no matter
what experiences, observations, and knowledge are appealed to.” (p.142, see also
pp.136-137) Further on he remarks, “Material logical deduction is indispensable.
It deceives us only when we form arbitrary abstract definitions, especially those
which involve infinitely many objects. In such cases we have illegitimately used
material logical deduction; i.e., we have not paid sufficient attention to the
preconditions necessary for its valid use.” (p.142). Hilbert concludes, “Our
principal result is that the infinite is nowhere to be found in reality. It neither
exists in nature nor provides a legitimate basis for rational thought . . . The
role that remains for the infinite to play is solely that of an idea . . . which
transcends all experience and which completes the concrete as a totality . . .”
(Hilbert, p.151).
5.1 Arguments against Actual Infinity
What are we to make of these intuitions and arguments? There are many math-
ematicians and philosophers who espouse them. There are also a large number
who maintain that they are flawed. From the point of view of cosmology itself,
it would be very helpful if we could trust in the conclusion that an actualized
mathematical infinity is physically impossible. For then this would provide a
constraint on the scenarios we use in cosmology, and assure us that probability
calculations using them could be successfully pursued. If, instead, there emerges
a clear indication that actual infinite sets are possible, that would be mathe-
matically disappointing. However, it still would be an important conclusion,
providing guidance and reassurance in our quest to understand not only our
observable universe, but the universe or multiverse as whole, even though we
will never have direct access to all of it (see Section 7, below).
It is not possible to explore this issue conclusively here. Philosophers and
philosophers of mathematics and science have proposed many arguments against
the possibility of realized or actual mathematical infinities, and many others,
arguments in their favor. A careful critical review is far beyond the scope
of this paper. We need, however, to go beyond the general and somewhat
unfocused reasonings of Aristotle, Hilbert and others we have summarized in
the introduction to this section. Thus, we shall briefly but more carefully present
several arguments against actual mathematical infinities which we consider the
strongest. Then in the next section we shall explore in detail some of the
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mathematical and physical reasons for which we should avoid admitting actual
infinities.
We begin by proposing several key definitions. An actually existing set is one
which has concrete physical status in our extra-mental, intersubjective experi-
ence, and each of whose members has a determinate, phenomenally supported
status in our experience, distinct from other members, with physically charac-
terisable features and integrity (e. g., a certain mass or energy, etc.). If the
members of the set are not distinct or determinate, then the set is either not
well-defined or is not actually existing.10 Any such actually existing set, and
the members constituting it, is contingent. They depend on something else for
being the way they are. It came into existence at a certain moment, or within a
certain series of moments, as the result of a certain process, and eventually dis-
sipates or dissolves, gradually changing into something else over time. This is a
pervasive feature of our experience and of our scientific investigation of physical
reality.
An infinite set is, as we have already said, one the number of whose members
is open, indeterminate and unbounded. By “indeterminate” we mean unspec-
ified in terms of a definite number. Infinity, strictly speaking is not a number
in any usual sense – it is beyond all specific numbers which might be assigned
to a set or system – it is simply the code-word for “it continues without end”.
This definition reflects how the term “infinity” is used in mathematical physics,
and in most of mathematics. The key point is that there is no specific number
which can be assigned to the number of elements in an infinite set. One could
say that the number of its elements is one of Cantor’s transfinite numbers, but
those are not numbers which specify a determinate bound.
An infinite physically existing set is an infinite set which is also an actually
existing set – in other words it possesses an infinity of really existing objects.
The number of its objects is therefore unbounded and indeterminate. That
means in essence that, though it is unbounded and indeterminate in number, it
is nevertheless physically realized as complete. One should note at this point
that the definition is contradictory, not from a logical or mathematical point of
view (see Stoeger 2004), but from the point of view of physics and metaphysics.
Can what is essentially indeterminate and unbounded be physically or really
complete, which seems to imply “bounded”? Can anything which physically
exists be completely unbounded? It is clear from our definition of infinity that
it is not a specific number we can determine. Not only is it beyond any number
we can specify or conceive. It is unboundedly large and indeterminate. But
an actual infinity is conceived as extra-mentally instantiated and therefore as
completed. That means it must be determinate and in some definite sense
bounded. But this contradicts the definition of what infinity is. Something
cannot be bounded and determinate, and unbounded and indeterminately large,
at the same time. Therefore, an actual physically realized infinity is not possible.
This appears, on the face of it, to be a compelling conceptual argument
10In quantum theory, the members of a set (e. g. particles) may be virtual, going into
and out of existence, but at any one time there are only “so many.” Furthermore, there is a
number operator, even though the particles themselves cannot be physically distinguished.
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against an actual really existing infinite set of objects, whether they be uni-
verses, or something else. The only way to counter it would be to show that an
indeterminate unboundedly large set is physically realisable. Conceptually this
seems to be impossible, just from the point of view of what we mean by physi-
cally concrete or actual, which seems to demand specifications and some bound-
edness. Something which is unboundedly large, and therefore not specifiable or
determinate in quantity or extent, is not materially or physically realisable. It is
not just that we are incapable of knowing an actual infinity. It seems to involve
a definite physical impossibility – the unbounded indeterminateness essential to
infinity is inconsistent with what it means to be physically instantiated.
Another way of putting this is that the definition of infinity is an issue in
mathematics, not in physics. The problem arises in linking the well-defined
mathematical concept of infinity with attempts at its realisation in physics.
Realisations in physics must have some determinateness – but infinity as such
is not determinate!
This is recognized implicitly in scientific and applied mathematics practice.
Whenever infinite values of physical parameters arise in physics – such as in
the case of singularities – we can be reasonably sure, as is often indicated,
that there has been a breakdown in our models. An achieved infinity in any
physical parameter (temperature, density, spatial curvature) is almost certainly
not a possible outcome of any physical process – simply because it is unboundly
large, indefinite and indeterminate.
A second supporting argument against realized infinity can be constructed
as follows. Since a realised infinite set of objects is actually existing as a phys-
ical set, it is contingent and therefore must have come into existence by some
generating process.11 Then there are two possibilities: 1. it became an actual
infinite set by some process of successive addition; or 2. it was produced as an
infinite set all at once.
But 1. does not work, since one cannot achieve a physically infinite set
by successive addition – we can never actually arrive at infinity that way (see
Spitzer 2000 and Stoeger 2004, and references therein). There is no physical
process or procedure we can in principle implement to complete such a set –
they are simply incompletable. Some will concede that we can never physically
arrive at infinity in a finite time (see Smith 1993), but maintain we can do so
in an infinite time. But then we have the same problem again with time – that,
for that to happen, we must complete an infinite number of events. But that
seems to contradict the essentially unbounded and indeterminate character of
“infinite time.”
So that leaves us with possibility 2., that the infinite set was physically
produced all at once. This is the one possibility Bertrand Russell admits (Rus-
sell 1960). But, to produce an infinite realized set of physical objects all at
once requires a process which makes an actually infinite amount of mass-energy
11When contemplating mathematical concepts, it is debatable as to whether a procedure or
process is needed. But we are talking physics, and the issue is precisely whether or not the
concept is realisable in the physical sense.
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available. Again this must be a real complete, specified, infinite amount of mass-
energy. But this seems conceptually contradictory again, for similar reasons.
Furthermore, the specification “all at once” demands simultaneity, which
is totally coordinate dependent. What is simultaneous with respect to one
coordinate system is not simultaneous with respect to another. Thus, there is
no assurance to begin with that one can avoid the temporal completion problem
with 1. above; indeed one cannot do so with respect to all coordinate systems.
Therefore, once again here on several counts it seems that a really infinite set
of physical objects is not realisable or actualizable.
These arguments underscore the fact that the problem with a realised infin-
ity is not primarily physical in the usual sense – it is primarily a conceptual or
philosophical problem. “Infinity” as it is mathematically conceived and used, is
not the sort of property that can be physically realised in an entity, an object,
or a system, like a definite number can. It is indeterminately large, and really
refers to a process rather than to an entity (Bracken 1995, pp. 11-24). And the
process it refers to has no term or completion specified. No physically mean-
ingful parameter really possesses an infinite value. It is true that cosmologists
and physicists use infinities in ways which seem to border on realised infini-
ties, such as an infinite number of points in a line segment, an infinite number
of directions from any point in three-space, or an infinite dimensional Hilbert
space.12 However, these are potential infinities, indicating possible directions,
locations or states that could be taken or occupied. In no case are they all
realised, occupied or taken by distinguishable, really existing entities.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that actual physically realized infinities lead
to a variety of apparently irresolvably paradoxical, if not contradictory results
(see Craig 1993) in thought experiments, such as those involving adding to
and borrowing books from a really infinite library, or putting up new guests in
an already fully occupied hotel of an infinite number of rooms. In fact, just
the notion of a completed infinite set seems to underlie some of the disturbing
paradoxes of set theory (see Craig 1993 for a brief discussion and references).
This issue is distinct from the difference between an ontologically realised
infinity or an epistemologically realised infinity. What we have presented above
seems to undermine the possibility of the former, at least as a physical possibility.
But it is a separate question whether or not, granted the existence of a physically
realized infinity, it could ever be known or specified as such in a completed and
determinate way.
5.2 Actual Infinities in Cosmology?
Whether or not actual infinities are possible, they certainly need to be avoided
on the physical level, in order to make progress in studying multiverses. As we
have already discussed, actual infinities lead to irresolvable problems in making
probability calculations; and their existence or non-existence is certainly not
observationally provable. They are an untestable proposal.
12We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out these examples.
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In the physical universe spatial infinities can be avoided by compact spa-
tial sections, either resultant from positive spatial curvature or from choice of
compact topologies in universes that have zero or negative spatial curvature,
(for example FLRW flat and open universes can have finite rather than infinite
spatial sections). We argue that the theoretically possible infinite space sections
of many cosmologies at a given time are simply unattainable in practice - they
are a theoretical idea that cannot be realised. It is certainly unprovable that
they exist, if they do. However one can potentially get evidence against such in-
finities - if either it is observationally proven that we live in a a ‘small universe’,
where we have already seen round the universe because the spatial sections are
compact on a scale smaller than the Hubble scale (Lachieze-Ray and Luminet
1995);13 or if we prove that the spatial curvature of the best-fit FLRW universe
model is positive, which necessarily implies closed spatial sections (see Sec.7.4
below).
Future infinite time also is never realised: rather the situation is that what-
ever time we reach, there is always more time available.14 Much the same applies
to claims of a past infinity of time: there may be unbounded time available in
the past in principle, but in what sense can it be attained in practice? The ar-
guments against an infinite past time are strong - it is simply not constructible
in terms of events or instants of time, besides being conceptually indefinite.15
The same problem of a realised infinity appears in considering supposed en-
sembles of really existing universes. Aside from the strictly philosophical issues
we have discussed above, conceiving of an ensemble of many ‘really existing’
universes that are totally causally disjoint from our own, and how that could
come into being presents a severe challenge to cosmologists. There are two fun-
damental reasons for this. First, specifying the geometry of a generic universe
requires an infinite amount of information because the quantities in P geometry
are fields on spacetime, in general requiring specification at each point (or equiv-
alently, an infinite number of Fourier coefficients) - they will almost always not
be algorithmically compressible. This greatly aggravates all the problems re-
garding infinity and the ensemble itself. Only in highly symmetric cases, like
the FLRW solutions, does this data reduce to a finite number of parameters.
One can suggest that a statistical description would suffice, where a finite set
of numbers describes the statistics of the solution, rather than giving a full de-
scription. Whether this suffices to describe adequately an ensemble where ‘all
13There are some observational indications that this could be so (see Sec.(7.4)), but they
are far from definitive.
14Obviously this does not mean that we reject standard Big Bang cosmology – rejecting
the really spatially infinite universes as unrealizable does not undermine the observational
adequacy of these models, nor the essence of the Big Bang scenario, even in the cases of those
which are flat or open. It just indicates that these models are incomplete, which we already
recognized.
15One way out would be, as quite a bit of work in quantum cosmology seems to indicate, to
have time originating or emerging from the quantum-gravity dominated primordial substrate
only “later.” In other words, there would have been a “time” or an epoch before time as
such emerged. Past time would then be finite, as seems to be demanded by philosophical
arguments, and yet the timeless primordial state could have lasted “forever,” whatever that
would mean. This possibility avoids the problem of constructibility.
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that can happen, happens’ is a moot point. We suggest not, for the simple
reason that there is no guarantee that all possible models will be included in
any known statistical description. That assumption is a major restriction on
what is assumed to be possible.
Secondly, if many universes in the ensemble themselves really have infinite
spatial extent and contain an infinite amount of matter, that entails certain
deeply paradoxical conclusions (Ellis and Brundrit 1979). To conceive of the
physical creation of an infinite set of universes (most requiring an infinite amount
of information for their prescription, and many of which will themselves be
spatially infinite) is at least an order of magnitude more difficult than specifying
an existent infinitude of finitely specifiable objects.
The phrase ‘everything that can exist, exists’ implies such an infinitude, but
glosses over all the profound difficulties implied. One should note here particu-
larly that problems arise in this context in terms of the continuum assigned by
classical theories to physical quantities and indeed to spacetime itself. Suppose
for example that we identify corresponding times in the models in an ensemble
and then assume that all values of the density parameter occur at each spatial
point at that time. On the one hand, because of the real number continuum,
this is an uncountably infinite set of models – and, as we have already seen,
genuine existence of such an uncountable infinitude is highly problematic. But
on the other hand, if the set of realised models is either finite or countably infi-
nite, then almost all possible models are not realised – the ensemble represents
a set of measure zero in the set of possible universes. Either way the situation
is distinctly uncomfortable.
However, we might try to argue around this by a discretization argument:
maybe differences in some parameter of less than say 10−10 are unobservable,
so we can replace the continuum version by a discretised one, and perhaps
some such discretisation is forced on us by quantum theory - indeed this is a
conclusion that follows from loop quantum gravity, and is assumed by many
to be the case whether loop quantum gravity is the best theory of quantum
gravity or not. That solves the ‘ultraviolet divergence’ associated with the small-
scale continuum, but not the ‘infrared divergence’ associated with supposed
infinite distances, infinite times, and infinite values of parameters describing
cosmologies.
Even within the restricted set of FLRW models, the problem of realised in-
finities is profoundly troubling: if all that is possible in this restricted subset
happens, we have multiple infinities of realised universes in the ensemble. First,
there are an infinite number of possible spatial topologies in the negative cur-
vature case (see e.g. Lachieze-Ray and Luminet 1995), so an infinite number
of ways that universes which are locally equivalent can differ globally. Second,
even though the geometry is so simple, the uncountable continuum of numbers
plays a devastating role locally: is it really conceivable that FLRW universes
actually occur with all values independently of both the cosmological constant
and the gravitational constant, and also all values of the Hubble constant, at
the instant when the density parameter takes the value 0.97? This gives 3 sepa-
rate uncountably infinite aspects of the ensemble of universes that are supposed
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to exist. Again, the problem would be allayed if spacetime is quantized at the
Planck level, as suggested for example by loop quantum gravity. In that case
one can argue that all physical quantities also are quantized, and the uncount-
able infinities of the real line get transmuted into finite numbers in any finite
interval – a much better situation. We believe that this is a physically reason-
able assumption to make, thus softening a major problem for many ensemble
proposals. But the intervals are still infinite for many parameters in the possi-
bility space. Reducing the uncountably infinite to countably infinite does not
in the end resolve the problem of infinities in these ensembles. It is still an
extraordinarily extravagant proposal, and, as we have just discussed, seems to
founder in the face of careful conceptual analysis.
The argument given so far is based in the nature of the application of math-
ematics to the description of physical reality. We believe that it carries con-
siderable weight, even though the ultimate nature of the mathematics-physics
connection is one of the great philosophical puzzles. It is important to recognize,
however, that arguments regarding problems with realised infinity arise from the
physics side, independently of the mathematical and conceptual consideration
we have so far emphasized.
On one hand, broad quantum theoretical considerations suggest that space-
time may be discrete at the Planck scale, and some specific quantum gravity
models indeed have been shown to incorporate this feature when examined in
detail. If this is so, not only does it remove the real number line as a physics
construct, but it inter alia has the potential to remove the ultraviolet divergences
that otherwise plague field theory – a major bonus.
On the other hand, it has been known for a long time that there are signif-
icant problems with putting boundary conditions for physical theories actually
at infinity. It was for this reason that Einstein preferred to consider universe
models with compact spatial sections (thus removing the occurrence of spatial
infinity in these models). This was a major motivation for his static universe
model proposed in 1917, which necessarily has compact space sections. John
Wheeler picked up this theme, and wrote about it extensively in his book Ein-
stein’s Vision (1968). Subsequently, the book Gravitation by Misner, Thorne
and Wheeler (1973) only considered spatially compact, positively curved uni-
verse models in the main text. Those with flat and negative spatial curvatures
where relegated to a subsection on “Other Models.”
Thus, this concern regarding infinity has a substantial physics provenance,
independent of Hilbert’s mathematical arguments and philosophical consider-
ations. It recurs in present day speculations on higher dimensional theories,
where the higher dimensions are in many cases assumed to be compact, as in
the original Kaluza-Klein theories. Various researchers have then commented
that “dimensional democracy” suggests all spatial sections should be compact,
unless one has some good physical reason why those dimensions that remained
small are compact while those that have expanded to large sizes are not. Hence
we believe there is substantial support from physics itself for the idea that the
universe may have compact spatial sections, thus also avoiding infra-red diver-
gences – even though this may result in “non-standard” topologies for its spatial
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sections. Such topologies are commonplace in string theory and in M-theory –
indeed they are essential to their nature.
6 On the origin of ensembles
Ensembles have been envisaged both as resulting from a single causal process,
and as simply consisting of discrete entities. We discuss these two cases in turn,
and then show that they are ultimately not distinguishable from each other.
6.1 Processes Naturally Producing Ensembles
Over the past 15 or 20 years, many researchers investigating the very early
universe have proposed processes at or near the Planck era which would generate
a really existing ensemble of expanding universe domains, one of which is our
own observable universe. In fact, their work has provided both the context and
stimulus for our discussions in this paper. Each of these processes essentially
selects a really existing ensemble from a set of possible universes, often leading
to a proposal for a natural definition of a probability distribution on the space
of possible universes. Here we briefly describe some of these, and comment on
how they fit within the framework we have been discussing.
The earliest explicit proposal for an ensemble of universes or universe do-
mains was by Vilenkin (1983). Andrei Linde’s chaotic inflationary proposal
(Linde 1983, 1990, 2003) is one of the best known scenarios of this type. The
scalar field (inflaton) in these scenarios drives inflation and leads to the gener-
ation of a large number of causally disconnected regions of the Universe. This
process is capable of generating a really existing ensemble of expanding FLRW-
like regions, one of which may be our own observable universe region, situated
in a much larger universe that is inhomogeneous on the largest scales. No
FLRW approximation is possible globally; rather there are many FLRW-like
sub-domains of a single fractal universe. These domains can be very differ-
ent from one another, and can be modelled locally by FLRW cosmologies with
different parameters.
Vilenkin, Linde and others have applied a stochastic approach to inflation
(Vilenkin 1983, Starobinsky 1986, Linde, et al. 1994, Vilenkin 1995, Garriga
and Vilenkin 2001, Linde 2003), through which probability distributions can
be derived from inflaton potentials along with the usual cosmological equations
(the Friedmann equation and the Klein-Gordon equation for the inflaton) and
the slow-roll approximation for the inflationary era. A detailed example of
this approach, in which specific probability distributions are derived from a
Langevin-type equation describing the stochastic behaviour of the inflaton over
horizon-sized regions before inflation begins, is given in Linde and Mezhlumian
(2003) and in Linde et al. (1994). The probability distributions determined in
this way generally are functions of the inflaton potential.
As we mentioned in the introduction, over the past few years considerable
progress has been achieved by theorists in developing flux stabilized, compact-
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ified, non-supersymmetric solutions to superstring/M theory which possess an
enormous number of vacua (Susskind 2003, Kachru, et al. 2003, and references
therein). Each of these vacua has the potential for becoming a separate uni-
verse or universe domain, with a non-zero cosmological constant. As such it
is relatively easy to initiate inflation in many of them. Furthermore, the dy-
namics leading to these vacua also generate different values of the some of the
other cosmological and physical parameters, and enable a statistical treatment
of string vacua themselves.
These kinds of scenario suggests how overarching physics, or a “law of
laws”(represented by the inflaton field and its potential), can lead to a really
existing ensemble of many very different FLRW-like regions of a larger Universe.
However these proposals rely on extrapolations of presently known physics to
realms far beyond where its reliability is assured. They also employ inflaton
potentials which as yet have no connection to the particle physics we know at
lower energies. And these proposals are not directly observationally testable –
we have no astronomical evidence that the supposed other FLRW-like regions
exist, and indeed do not expect to ever attain such evidence. Thus they re-
main theoretically based proposals rather than provisionally acceptable models
– much less established fact. There remains additionally the difficult problem
of infinities, which we have just discussed: eternal inflation with its continual
reproduction of different inflating domains of the Universe is claimed to lead
to an infinite number of universes of each particular type (Linde, private com-
munication). How can one deal with these infinities in terms of distribution
functions and an adequate measure? As we have pointed out above, there is
a philosophical problem surrounding a realised infinite set of any kind. In this
case the infinities of really existent FLRW-like domains derive from the assumed
initial infinite flat (or open) space sections - and we have already pointed out
the problems in assuming such space sections are actually realised. If this is
correct, then at the very least these proposals must be modified so that they
generate a finite number of universes or universe domains.
Finally, from the point of view of the ensemble of all possible universes often
invoked in discussions of multiverses, all possible inflaton potentials should be
considered, as well as all solutions to all those potentials. They should all
be represented in M, which will include chaotic inflationary models which are
stationary as well as those which are non-stationary. Many of these potentials
may yield ensembles which are uninteresting as far as the emergence of life is
concerned, but some will be bio-friendly.
In EKS we have briefly reviewed various proposals for probability distribu-
tions of the cosmological constant over ensembles of universe domains generated
by the same inflaton potential, particularly those of Weinberg (2000) and Gar-
riga and Vilenkin (2000, 2001). We shall not revisit this work here, except to
mention the strong anthropic constraints on values of the cosmological constant,
which is the primary reason for interest in this case. Galaxy formation is only
possible for a narrow range of values of the cosmological constant, Λ, around
Λ = 0 (one order of magnitude - hugely smaller than the 120 orders of magnitude
predicted by quantum field theory as its natural value).
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6.2 Testability of these proposals
In his popular book Our Cosmic Habitat Martin Rees (Rees 2001b, pp. 175ff)
uses this narrow range of bio-friendly values of Λ to propose a preliminary test
which he claims could rule out the multiverse explanation of fine-tuning for cer-
tain parameters like Λ. This is what might be called a “speciality argument.”
According to Rees, if “our universe turns out to be even more specially tuned
than our presence requires,” the existence of a multiverse to explain such “over-
tuning” would be refuted. The argument itself goes this way. Naive quantum
physics expects Λ to be very large. But our presence in the universe requires
it to be very small, small enough so that galaxies and stars can form. Thus,
in our universe Λ must obviously be below that galaxy-forming threshold. This
explains the observed very low value of Λ as a selection effect in an existing en-
semble of universes. Although the probability of selecting at random a universe
with a small Λ is very small, it becomes large when we add the prior that life
exists. Now, in any universe in which life exists, we would not expect Λ to be too
far below this threshold. Otherwise it would be more fine-tuned than needed.
In fact, data presently indicates that Λ is not too far below the threshold, and
thus our universe is not markedly more special than it needs to be, as far as
Λ is concerned. Consequently, explaining its fine-tuning by assuming a really
existing multiverse is acceptable. Rees suggests that the same argument can be
applied to other parameters.
Is this argument compelling? As Hartle (2004) has pointed out, for the first
stage to be useful, we need an a priori distribution for values of Λ that is very
broad, combined with a very narrow set of values that allow for life. These
values should be centred far from the most probable a priori values. This is
indeed the case if we suppose a very broad Gaussian distribution for Λ centred
at a very large value, as suggested by quantum field theory. Then, regarding
the second stage of the argument, the values allowing for life fall within a very
narrow band centred at zero, as implied by astrophysics. Because the biophilic
range is narrow, the a priori probability for Λ will not vary significantly in this
range. Thus, it is equally likely to take any value. Thus a uniform probability
assumption will be reasonably well satisfied within the biophilic range of Λ.
As regards this second stage of the argument, because of the uniform prob-
ability assumption it is not clear why the expected values for the existence of
galaxies should pile up near the biological limit. Indeed, one might expect the
probability of the existence of galaxies to be maximal at the centre of the bio-
philic range rather than at the edges (this probability drops to zero at the edges,
because it vanishes outside – hence the likelihood of existence of galaxies at the
threshold itself should be very small). Thus there is no justification on this
basis for ruling out a multiverse with any specific value for Λ within that range.
As long as the range of values of a parameter like Λ is not a zero-measure set
of the ensemble, there is a non-zero probability of choosing a universe within
it. In that case, there is no solid justification for ruling out a multiverse and
so no real testability of the multiverse proposal. All we can really say is that
we would be less likely to find ourselves in a universe with a Λ in that range
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in that particular ensemble. Indeed no probability argument can conclusively
disprove any specific result - all it can state is that the result is improbable -
but that statement only makes sense if the result is possible! What is actually
meant by “more specially tuned than necessary for our existence”? In the end,
any particular choice of a life-allowing universe will be more specially tuned for
something. In our view “tuning” refers to parameters selected such that the
model falls into a certain class, e.g., life-allowing. Any additional tuning would
then just be the selection of sub-classes, and, after all, any particular model is
“over-tuned” in such a way as to select uniquely the sub-class which contains
only itself. Rees’s argument seems to imply that Λ close to zero would be an
over-tuned case, while Λ close to the cut-off value would not be. However, would
the reversed viewpoint be not just as legitimate?
Rees’s argument strongly builds on the predictions of quantum physics — a
probability distribution peaked at very high values for Λ. Taking into account
the unknown relation between general relativity and quantum physics we should
treat the problem as a multiple hypothesis testing problem: The multiverse
scenario can be true or false, and so can the quantum prediction for high values
of Λ. An observed low value of Λ would then strongly question the predictions
for Λ, but say nothing about the multiverse scenario. We conclude that any
observed value of Λ does not rule out the multiverse scenario. It also seems
questionable whether the life-allowing values for Λ can be classified just by a
simple cut-off value. It should be expected that there are more subtle and yet
unknown constraints. Observing a cosmological constant far from the cut-off
value might then just be the result of some unknown constraints.
Finally, probability arguments simply don’t apply if there is indeed only
one universe - their very use assumes a multiverse exists. There might exist
only one universe which just happens to have the observed value of Λ; then
probabilistic arguments will simply not apply. Thus what we are being offered
here is not in fact a proof a multiverse exists, but rather a consistency check as
regards the nature of the proposed multiverse. It is a proposal for a necessary
but not sufficient condition for its existence. As emphasized above, we do not
even believe it is a necessary condition; rather it is a plausibility indicator.
6.3 The existence of regularities
Consider now a genuine multiverse. Why should there be any regularity at all
in the properties of universes in such an ensemble, where the universes are com-
pletely disconnected from each other? If there are such regularities and specific
resulting properties, this suggests a mechanism creating that family of universes,
and hence a causal link to a higher domain which is the seat of processes leading
to these regularities. This in turn means that the individual universes making
up the ensemble are not actually independent of each other. They are, instead,
products of a single process, or meta-process, as in the case of chaotic inflation.
A common generating mechanism is clearly a causal connection, even if not sit-
uated in a single connected spacetime – and some such mechanism is needed if
all the universes in an ensemble have the same class of properties, for example
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being governed by the same physical laws or meta-laws.
The point then is that, as emphasized when we considered how one can
describe ensembles, any multiverse with regular properties that we can charac-
terise systematically is necessarily of this kind. If it did not have regularities
of properties across the class of universes included in the ensemble, we could
not even describe it, much less calculate any properties or even characterise a
distribution function.
Thus in the end the idea of a completely disconnected multiverse with reg-
ular properties but without a common causal mechanism of some kind is not
viable. There must necessarily be some pre-realisation causal mechanism at
work determining the properties of the universes in the ensemble. What are
claimed to be totally disjoint universes must in some sense indeed be causally
connected together, albeit in some pre-physics or meta-physical domain that
is causally effective in determining the common properties of the universes in
the multiverse. This is directly related to the two key issues we highlighted
above in Sections 2 and 3, respectively, namely how does the possibility space
originate, and where does the distribution function that characterises realised
models come from?
From these considerations, we see that we definitely need to explain (for
Issue 2) what particular cosmogonic generating process or meta-law pre-exists,
and how that process or meta-law was selected from those that are possible.
Obviously an infinite regress lurks in the wings. Though intermediate scientific
answers to these questions can in principle be given, it is clear that no ultimate
scientific foundation can be provided.
Furthermore, we honestly have to admit that any proposal for a particular
cosmic generating process or principle we establish as underlying our actually
existing ensemble of universe domains or universes, after testing and validation
(see Section 7 below), will always be at best provisional and imperfect: we will
never be able to definitively determine its nature or properties. The actually
existing cosmic ensemble may in fact be much, much larger – or much, much
smaller – than the one our physics at any given time describes, and embody
quite different generating processes and principles than the ones we provisionally
settle upon. This is particularly true as we shall never have direct access to the
ensemble we propose, or to the underlying process or potential upon which its
existence relies (see Section 7 below), nor indeed to the full range of physics
that may be involved.
6.4 The existence of possibilities
Turning to the prior question (Issue 1, see Section 2.1), what determines the
space of all possible universes, from which a really existing universe or an ensem-
ble of universes or universe domains is drawn, we find ourselves in even much
more uncertain waters. This is particularly difficult when we demand some
basic meta-principle which delimits the set of possibilities. Where would such
a principle originate? The only two secure grounds for determining possibility
are existence (”ab esse ad posse valet illatio”) and freedom from internal con-
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tradiction. The first really does not help us at all in exploring the boundaries
of the possible. The second leaves enormous unexplored, and probably unex-
plorable, territory. There are almost certainly realms of the possible which we
cannot even imagine. But at the same time, there may be, as we have already
mentioned, universes we presently think are possible which are not. We really
do not have secure grounds for determining the limits of possibility in this ex-
panded cosmic context. We simply do not have enough theoretical knowledge
to describe and delimit reliably the realm of the possible, and it is very doubtful
we shall ever have.
7 Testability and Existence
The issue of evidence and testing has already been briefly mentioned. This is
at the heart of whether an ensemble or multiverse proposal should be regarded
as physics or as metaphysics.
7.1 Evidence and existence
Given all the possibilities discussed here, which specific kind of ensemble is
claimed to exist? Given a specific such claim, how can one show that this is the
particular ensemble that exists rather than all the other possibilities?
There is no direct evidence of existence of the claimed other universe regions
in an ensemble, nor can there be any, for they lie beyond the visual horizon;
most will even be beyond the particle horizon, so there is no causal connection
with them; and in the case of a true multiverse, there is not even the possibility
of any indirect causal connection - the universes are then completely disjoint
and nothing that happens in any one of them is causally linked to what happens
in any other one (see Section 6.2). This lack of any causal connection in such
multiverses really places them beyond any scientific support – there can be no
direct or indirect evidence for the existence of such systems. We may, of course,
postulate the existence of such a multiverse as a metaphysical assumption, but it
would be a metaphysical assumption without any further justifiability – it would
be untestable and unsupportable by any direct or indeed indirect evidence.
And so, we concentrate on possible really existing multiverses in which there
is some common causal generating principle or process. What weight does a
claim of such existence carry in this case, when no direct observational evidence
can ever be available? The point is that there is not just an issue of showing
a multiverse exists. If this is a scientific proposition one needs to be able to
show which specific multiverse exists; but there is no observational way to do
this. Indeed if you can’t show which particular one exists, it is doubtful you
have shown any one exists. What does a claim for such existence mean in this
context? Gardner puts it this way: ”There is not the slightest shred of reliable
evidence that there is any universe other than the one we are in. No multiverse
theory has so far provided a prediction that can be tested. As far as we can tell,
universes are not even as plentiful as even two blackberries” (Gardner 2003).
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This contrasts strongly, for example, with Deutsch’s and Lewis’s defence of the
concept (Deutsch 1998, Lewis 2000).
7.2 Fruitful Hypotheses and evidence
There are, however, ways of justifying the existence of an entity, or entities, like
a multiverse, even though we have no direct observations of it. Arguably the
most compelling framework within which to discuss testability is that of “retro-
duction” or “abduction” which was first described in detail by C.S.Peirce. Ernan
McMullin (1992) has convincingly demonstrated that retroduction is the ratio-
nal process by which scientific conclusions are most fruitfully reached. On the
basis of what researchers know, they construct imaginative hypotheses, which
are then used to probe and to describe the phenomena in deeper and more ad-
equate ways than before. As they do so, they will modify or even replace the
original hypotheses, in order to make them more fruitful and more precise in
what they reveal and explain. The hypotheses themselves may often presume
the existence of certain hidden properties or entities (like multiverses!) which
are fundamental to the explanatory power they possess. As these hypotheses
become more and more fruitful in revealing and explaining the natural phenom-
ena they investigate, and their inter-relationships, and more central to scientific
research in a given discipline, they become more and more reliable accounts
of the reality they purport to model or describe. Even if some of the hidden
properties or entities they postulate are never directly detected or observed,
the success of the hypotheses indirectly leads us to affirm that something like
them must exist.16 A cosmological example is the inflaton supposed to underlie
inflation.
Thus, from this point of view, the existence of an ensemble of universes or
universe domains would be a validly deduced – if still provisional – scientific con-
clusion if this becomes a key component of hypotheses which are successful and
fruitful in the long term. By an hypothesis which manifests long-term success
and fruitfulness we mean one that better enables us to make testable predictions
which are fulfilled, and provides a more thorough and coherent explanation of
phenomena we observe than competing theories.17 Ernan McMullin (1992; see
also P. Allen 2001, p. 113) frames such fruitfulness and success as:
a. accounting for all the relevant data (empirical adequacy);
b. providing long-term explanatory success and stimulating fruitful lines of
16In light of discussions by McMullin elsewhere (McMullin 1993, pp. 381-382) more care and
precision is needed here. He recommends separating explanation from proof of existence: “In
science, the adequacy of a theoretical explanation is often regarded as an adequate testimony
to the existence of entities postulated by the theory. But the debates that swirl around this
issue among philosophers (the issue of scientific realism, as philosophers call it) ought to warn
us of the risks of moving too easily from explanatory adequacy to truth-claims for the theory
itself. This sort of inference depends sensitively on the quality of the explanation given, on
the viability of alternatives, on our prior knowledge of beings in the postulated category, and
on other more complex factors.”
17It is interesting to note that Rees (2001b, p. 172) hints at the use of a retroductive
approach in cosmology, but does not develop the idea as an argument in any detail.
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further inquiry (theory fertility);
c. establishing the compatibility of previously disparate domains of phenom-
ena (unifying power);
d. manifesting consistency and correlation with other established theories
(theoretical coherence).
The relevant example here would be a fruitful theory relying on a specific
type of multiverse, all members of which would never be directly detectable
except one. But, since its postulated existence renders the existence and the
characteristic features of our own universe ever more intelligible and coherent
over a period of time, this can be claimed to be evidence for the multiverse’s
existence. If such indirect support for the existence of a given multiverse is
inadequate in the light of other competing accounts, then from a scientific point
of view all we can do is to treat it as a speculative scenario needing further
development and requiring further fruitful application. Without that, espous-
ing the existence of a given multiverse as the explanation for our life-bearing
universe must surely be called metaphysics, because belief in its existence will
forever be a matter of faith rather than proof or scientific support.
We do, of course, want to avoid sliding to the bottom of Rees’ (2001b, p. 169)
slippery slope. In arriving at his conclusion that the existence of other universes
is a scientific question, Rees (2001b, pp. 165-169) begins by considering first
galaxies which are beyond the limits of present-day telescopes, and then galaxies
which are beyond our visual horizon now, but will eventually come within it in
the future. In both cases these galaxies are real and observable in principle.
Therefore, they remain legitimate objects of scientific investigation. However,
then he goes on to consider galaxies which are forever unobservable, but which
emerged from the same Big Bang as ours did. And he concludes that, though
unobservable, they are real, and by implication should be included as objects
considered by science. Other universes, he argues, fall in the same category –
they are real, and therefore they should fall within the boundaries of scientific
competency. As articulated this is indeed “a slippery slope” argument – it can
be used to place anything that we claim to be “real” within the natural sciences
– unless we strengthen it at several points.
First, Rees shifts the criterion from “observable in principle” to being “real.”
This is really an error. No matter how real an object, process, or relationship
may be, if it is not observable in principle, or if there is not at least indirect
support for its existence from the long-term success of the hypotheses in which
it figures, then it simply falls outside serious scientific consideration. It may
still temporarily play a role in scientific speculation, but, unless it receives some
evidential support, that will not last. In mentioning that the forever unobserv-
able galaxies he is considering are produced by the same Big Bang as ours, Rees
may be intending to indicate that, though unobservable, they share a common
causal origin and therefore figure in successful hypotheses, as would be required
by McMullin’s retroductive inference discussed above. But Rees does not make
that clear. Moving to other universes, the same requirement holds. Thus, the
slippery slope is avoided precisely by implementing the ”indirect evidence by
fruitful hypotheses” approach that a careful application of retroduction requires.
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Second, there is discontinuity in the argument as one moves from weaker
and weaker causal relation to none at all. The slippery slope becomes a verti-
cal precipice on one side of an unbridgeable gulf. An argument that relies on
incremental continuity does not apply in this case.
Thus, if we are continually evaluating our theories and speculations with
regard to their potential and actual fruitfulness in revealing and explaining the
world around us, then we shall avoid the lower reaches of the slippery slope.
The problem is that, in this case, the multiverse hypothesis is very preliminary
and will probably always remain provisional. This should not prevent us from
entertaining imaginative scenarios, but the retroductive process will subject
these speculations to rigorous critique over time. The key issue then is to
what degree will the multiverse hypothesis become fruitful. Unfortunately, as
it stands now, it is not, because it can be used to explain anything at all – and
hence does not explain anything in particular. You cannot predict something
new from the hypothesis, but you can explain anything you already know. In
order for it to achieve some measure of scientific fruitfulness, there must be
an accumulation of at least indirect scientifically acceptable support for one
particular well-defined multiverse. Indeed, from a purely evidential viewpoint, a
multiverse with say 10120 identical copies of the one universe in which we actually
live would be much preferred over one with a vast variety of different universes,
for then the probability of finding a universe like our own would be much higher.
Such ensembles are usually excluded because of some hidden assumptions about
the nature of the generating mechanism that creates the ensemble. But maybe
that mechanism is of a different kind than usually assumed - perhaps once it
has found a successful model universe, it then churns out innumerable identical
copies of the same universe.
In the end belief in a multiverse may always be just that – a matter of faith,
namely faith that the logical arguments discussed here give the correct answer
in a situation where direct observational proof is unattainable and the supposed
underlying physics is untestable, unless we are able to point to compelling rea-
sons based on scientifically supportable evidence for a particular specifiable mul-
tiverse or one of a narrowly defined class of multiverses. One way in which this
could be accomplished, as we have already indicated, would be to find accumu-
lating direct or indirect evidence that a very definite inflaton potential capable
of generating a certain type of ensemble of universe domains was operating in
the very early universe, leading to the particular physics that we observe now.
Otherwise, there will be no way of ever knowing which particular multiverse is
realised, if any one is. We will always be able to claim whatever we wish about
such an ensemble, provided it includes at least one universe that admits life.
7.3 Observations and Physics
One way one might make a reasonable claim for existence of a multiverse would
be if one could show its existence was a more or less inevitable consequence of
well-established physical laws and processes. Indeed, this is essentially the claim
that is made in the case of chaotic inflation. However the problem is that the
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proposed underlying physics has not been tested, and indeed may be untestable.
There is no evidence that the postulated physics is true in this universe, much
less in some pre-existing metaspace that might generate a multiverse.
Thus there are two further requirements which must still be met, once we
have proposed a viable ensemble or multiverse theory. The first is to pro-
vide some credible link between these vast extrapolations from presently known
physics to physics in which we have some confidence. The second is to provide
some at least indirect evidence that the scalar potentials, or other overarching
cosmic principles involved, really have been functioning in the very early uni-
verse, or before its emergence. We do not at present fulfil either requirement.
The issue is not just that the inflaton is not identified and its potential
untested by any observational means - it is also that, for example, we are as-
suming quantum field theory remains valid far beyond the domain where it has
been tested, and where we have faith in that extreme extrapolation despite all
the unsolved problems at the foundation of quantum theory, the divergences of
quantum field theory, and the failure of that theory to provide a satisfactory
resolution of the cosmological constant problem.
7.4 Observations and disproof
Despite the gloomy prognosis given above, there are some specific cases where
the existence of a chaotic inflation (multi-domain) type scenario can be dis-
proved. These are when we either live in a universe with compact spatial sec-
tions because they have positive curvature, or in ‘small universe’ where we have
already seen right round the universe (Ellis and Schreiber 1986, Lachieze-Ray
and Luminet 1995), for then the universe closes up on itself in a single FLRW-
like domain, and so no further such domains that are causally connected to us
in a single connected spacetime can exist.
As regards the first case, the best combined astronomical data at present
(from the WMAP satellite together with number counts and supernova obser-
vations) suggest that this is indeed the case: they indicate that Ω0 = 1.02±0.02
at a 2-σ level, on the face of it favoring closed spatial sections and a spatially
finite universe. This data does not definitively rule out open models, but it
certainly should be taken seriously in an era of ‘precision cosmology.’
As regards the ‘small universe’ situation, this is in principle observationally
testable, and indeed it has been suggested that the CBR power spectrum might
already be giving us evidence that this is indeed so, because of its lack of power
on the largest angular scales (Luminet et al, 2003). This proposal can be tested
in the future by searching for identical circles in the CMB sky (Roukema, et
al., 2004) and alignment of the CMB quadrupole and octopole planes (Katz
and Weeks 2004). Success in this endeavour would disprove the usual chaotic
inflationary scenario, but not a true multiverse proposal, for that cannot be
shown to be false by any observation. Neither can it be shown to be true.
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8 Special or Generic?
When we reflect on the recent history of cosmology, we become aware that philo-
sophical predilections have oscillated from assuming that the present state of
our universe is very special (made cosmologically precise in contemporary cos-
mology as FLRW, or almost-FLRW, through the assumption of a Cosmological
Principle – see Bondi 1960 and Weinberg 1972, for example), requiring very
finely tuned initial conditions, to assuming it is generic, in the sense that it has
attained its present apparently special qualities through the operation of stan-
dard physical processes on any of broad range of possible initial conditions (e. g.,
the “chaotic cosmology” approach of Misner (1968) and the now standard but
incomplete inflationary scenario pioneered by Guth (1980)). This oscillation, or
tension, has been described and discussed in detail, both in its historical and
in its contemporary manifestations, by McMullin (1993) as a conflict or tension
between two general types of principle – anthropic-like principles, which recog-
nize the special character of the universe and tentatively presume that its origin
must be in finely tuned or specially chosen initial conditions, and “cosmogo-
nic indifference principles,” or just “indifference principles,” which concentrate
their search upon very generic initial conditions upon which the laws of physics
act to produce the special cosmic configuration we now enjoy. As McMullin
portrays these two philosophical commitments, the anthropic-type preference
inevitably attempts to involve mind and teleology as essential to the shaping
of what emerges, whereas the indifference-type preference studiously seeks to
avoid any direct appeal to such influences, relying instead completely upon the
dynamisms (laws of nature) inherent in and emerging from mass-energy itself.
McMullin (1993), in a compelling historical sketch, traces the preference
for the special and the teleologically suggestive from some of the earlier strong
anthropic principle formulations back through early Big Bang cosmology to
Clarke, Bentley, William Derham and John Ray in the 18th and 19th centuries
and Robert Boyle in the 17th century and ultimately back to Plato and the
Biblical stories of creation. The competing preference for indifferent initial con-
ditions and the operation of purely physical or biological laws can be similarly
followed back from the present appeal to multiverses to slightly earlier infla-
tionary scenarios and Misner’s chaotic cosmology program to steady state cos-
mological models and then back through Darwin to Descartes and much earlier
to the Greek atomists, such as Empedocles, Diogenes Laertius and Leucippus.
Neither of these historical sequences involves clearly dependent philosophical
influences, but the underlying basic assumptions and preferences of each of the
two sets of thinkers and models are very similar, as are their controversies and
interactions with the representatives of the competing approach.
Certainly it has become clear that the present preference among theoretical
cosmologists for multiverse scenarios is the latest and most concerted attempt
to implement the indifference principle in the face of the mounting evidence
that, taken alone, our universe does require very finely tuned initial conditions.
The introduction of inflation was similarly motivated, but has encountered some
scepticism in this regard with the growing sense that initiating inflation itself
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probably requires special conditions (Penrose 1989; Ellis, et al. 2002). The
appeal to multiverses, though first seriously suggested fairly early in this saga
(by Dicke in 1961 and by Carter in 1968), has been reasserted as this failure
of other indifference principle implementations seem more and more imminent.
However, as we have just seen in our detailed discussion of realised ensembles
of universes or universe domains, they are by no means unique, and accounting
for their existence requires an adequate generating process or principle, which
must explain the distribution function characterizing the ensemble.
Even though we are far from being able to connect specific types of ensem-
bles with particular provisionally adequate cosmogonic generating processes in a
compelling way, it is very possible that some fine-tuning of these processes may
be required to mesh with the physical constraints we observe in our universe
and at the same time to produce a realised ensemble which enbraces it. This
would initiate another oscillation between the two types of principles. Whether
or not that occurs, it is clear that the existence of a multiverse in itself does
not support either the indifference principle nor the anthropic-type principle.
What would do so would be the distribution function specifying the multiverse,
and particularly the physical, pre-physical or metaphysical process which gen-
erates the multiverse with that distribution function, or range of distribution
functions. Only an understanding of that process would ultimately determine
which principle is really basic.
Whatever the eventual outcome of future investigations probing this prob-
lem, it is both curious and striking, as McMullin (1993, p. 385) comments,
that “the same challenge arises over and over.” Fine- tuning at one level is
tentatively explained by some process at a more fundamental level which seems
at first sight indifferent to any initial conditions. But then further investiga-
tion reveals that that process really requires special conditions, which demands
some fine-tuning. Meanwhile, “the universe” required for understanding and
explanation “keeps getting larger and larger.”
It might seem that these competing philosophical or metaphysical prefer-
ences – for what is either basically special or basically generic – are choices
without scientific or philosophical support. But that is an illusion. From what
we have seen already, there is considerable physical and philosophical support for
each preference – some of it observational and some of it theoretical – but there
is no adequate or definitive support for one over against the other. Thus, either
preference may be supported in various ways philosophically and scientifically,
but neither the one nor the other is THE scientific approach. For example, the
emergent universe model of Ellis, Maartens, et al. (2003) has fine-tuned initial
conditions, but it still could be a good model – it may actually represent how the
very early history of our universe unfolded, even though it does not explain how
the special initial conditions were set. [In fact it is not as fine-tuned as inflation
with k = 0, which requires “infinite” fine-tuning, while being “asymptotic” to
an Einstein static universe does not.]
The issue is not so much which of the two principles or perspectives are
correct – both seem to be important at different levels and in different heuristic
and explanatory contexts. As far as we know, there has not been any resolution
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to the question of the epistemological or ontological status of either one. They
function rather as contrary heuristic preferences which have both intuitive and
experiential support. Perhaps the real question is: Which is more fundamental?
It is possible that, from the point of view of physics, the indifference principle
is more fundamental – relative to the explanations which are possible within
the sciences – whereas from the point of view of metaphysics, an anthropic-type
fine-tuning principle is more fundamental.
What does seem clear, in this regard, is that the effort to keep explanation
and understanding completely within the realm of physics forces us to choose
the indifference principle as more fundamental. This is simply because the need
for fine-tuning threatens to take us outside of where physics or any of the other
natural sciences can go. Furthermore, as we have also seen, physics and the
other sciences cannot delve into the realm of ultimate explanation either.
9 Conclusion
As we stressed in the conclusion of EKS, the introduction of the multiverse or
ensemble idea is a fundamental change in the nature of cosmology, because it
aims to challenge one of the most basic aspects of standard cosmology, namely
the uniqueness of the universe (see Ellis 1991, 1999 and references therein). So
far, research and discussion on such ensembles have not precisely specified what
is required to define them, although some specific physical calculations have
been given based on restricted low-dimensional multiverses.
Our fundamental starting point has been the recognition that there is an
important distinction to be made between possible universes and realised uni-
verses, and a central conclusion is that a really existing ensemble or multiverse is
not a priori unique, nor uniquely defined. It must somehow be selected for. We
have defined both the ensemble of possible universesM, and ensembles of really
existing universes, which are envisioned as generated by a given primordial pro-
cess or action of an overarching cosmic principle, physical or metaphysical. This
effectively selects a really existing multiverse from M, and, as such, effectively
defines a distribution function over M. Thus, there is a definite causal connec-
tion, or “law of laws, ”relating all the universes in each of those multiverses. It
is such a really existing ensemble of universes, one of which is our own universe,
not the ensemble of all possible universes, which provides the basis for anthropic
arguments. Anthropic universes lie in a small subset ofM, whose characteristics
we understand to some extent. It is very likely that the simultaneous realisa-
tion of all the conditions for life will pick out only a very small sector of the
parameter space of all possibilities: anthropic universes are fine-tuned in that
sense. If cosmogonic processes or the operation of a certain primordial principle
selected and generated an ensemble of really existing universes fromM, some of
which are anthropic, then, though we would require some explanation for that
process or principle, the fine-tuning of our universe would not require any other
scientific explanation. It is, however, abundantly clear that “really existing en-
sembles” are not unique, and neither their properties nor their existence are
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directly testable. Arguments for their existence would be much stronger if the
hypotheses employing them were fruitful in enabling new investigations leading
to new predictions and understandings which are testable. However, so far this
has not been the case. In our view these questions - Issues 1 and 2 in this paper
– cannot be answered scientifically with any adequacy because of the lack of
any possibility of verification of any proposed underlying theory. They will of
necessity have to be argued with a mixture of careful philosophically informed
science and scientifically informed philosophy. And, even with this, as we have
just seen, we seem to fall short of providing satisfactory answers – so far!
Another philosophical issue we have emphasized which has a strong bearing
on how we describe and delimit really existing multiverses is that of realised
infinity. From our careful discussion of this concept, there is a compelling case
for demanding that every really existing ensemble contain only a finite number
of universes or universe domains.
There is strong support for both of two competing approaches – that which
honors the special character of our universe by stressing the need for the fine-
tuning of initial conditions and the laws of nature, and that which locates its
emergence in the operation of primordial processes on a much more fundamental
generic or indifferent configuration. Both are undoubtedly at work on different
levels. The issues are: which is more fundamental, and whether the sciences
themselves as they are presently conceived and practiced can deal with ultimate
fundamentals. Must they yield that realm to metaphysics? Can metaphysics
deal with them? The relative untestability or unprovability of the multiverse
idea in the usual scientific sense is however problematic – the existence of the
hypothesized ensemble remains a matter of faith rather than of proof, unless
it comes to enjoy long-term fruitfulness and success. Furthermore in the end,
the multiverse hypothesis simply represents a regress of causation. Ultimate
questions remain: Why this multiverse with these properties rather than oth-
ers? What endows these with existence and with this particular type of overall
order? What are the ultimate boundaries of possibility – what makes something
possible, even though it may never be realised?
As we now see, the concept of a multiverse raises many fascinating issues that
have not yet been adequately explored. The discussions here should point and
guide research in directions which will yield further insight and understanding.
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